Introduction
Finland has largely been overlooked in the literature on multi-level political systems. This is largely because Finland constitutes one of the most stable unitary states in the world. Despite the creation of regional administrative structures to implement EU Regional Policy in the mid-1990s, Finland ultimately lacks an 'independent administrative meso-level' (Kull, 2009: 22) . Regional self-government has been a low concern in a country built around a strong central state and thriving municipalities.
However, this categorisation of Finland as a highly centralised, unitary state that lacks 'real regions' (Ryynänen 2003) neglects the status of a territorially concentrated and distinct population that possess a substantial degree of autonomy.
The Swedish-speaking Åland Islands -an archipelago located in the northern Baltic Sea -are the smallest and wealthiest province in Finland, and the only one that has been granted significant legislative powers. Despite having a population of only 27,000, Åland enjoys many of the trappings of sovereign statehood, with its own national flag, postage stamps, and citizenship laws. Thanks to a decree by the League of Nations in 1920, Åland's Home Rule is guaranteed by both Finnish and international law, and can only be altered with Åland's approval.
Åland's constitutionally embedded autonomy enables us to classify Åland within the 'federalized' box of cases examined within this Special issue. Åland's Autonomy Acts (1920, 1951, 1991 ) guarantee a non-hierarchical form of 'partnership' with Finland, whereby Åland can veto any competence transfer away from it. In other words, Åland is able to escape the constitutional uncertainty of its powers being revoked, as so happens in the case of 'regionalized' states which endure a hierarchical relationship with the centre. However, because Finland has not decentralized powers to other regions, Åland is very much an autonomous 'loner' in the Finnish unitary state. As there are no structures of shared rule, and no scope for multilateral negotiation, Åland's relations with Finland are conducted on a bilateral basis.
The special situation of a substate unit possessing constitutionally protected autonomy, but without a guarantee of shared rule at the centre, has led some scholars to create a new type of federalized relationship: a federacy. According to Stepan et al (2011) , 'a federacy is a political-administrative unit in an independent unitary state with exclusive power in certain areas, including some legislative power, constitutionally or quasi-constitutionally embedded, that cannot be changed unilaterally and whose inhabitants have full citizenship rights in the otherwise unitary state.' The main point here is that federacies are forged within unitary states and do not affect the constitutional nature of the rest of the state, unlike federations.
Interestingly, federacies occur overwhelmingly in islands and archipelagos (Hepburn, 2012) , and the Åland Islands are no exception.
The Autonomy Act (1991) 
that governs the relations between Åland and
Finland is a federal-like agreement that sets out the powers that fall within the exclusive authority of Åland, and powers that remain under the domain of Finland. As such, the Act ensures Åland's constitutionally guaranteed autonomy, which can only be amended by a two-third majority of both the Åland and Finnish Parliaments; it cannot be unilaterally altered or revoked. The citizens of Åland enjoy full citizenship rights in the state, can vote in statewide elections and elect a representative to the Finnish parliament. Finland also has a representative in Åland who helps coordinate activities that fall under state powers. Any Finnish laws or policies that pertain to Åland in any way must be explicitly approved by the Åland authorities and if Finland considers a bill that will have an impact on Åland (such as EU membership), Åland has a right to present its views and may exercise an opt-out or veto. In other words, it is necessary for Finland to gain Åland's consent before it signs international treaties.
Åland's special federalized status within the otherwise unitary Republic of Finland raises interesting questions when considering the effect of the constitutional structures on the coordination of intergovernmental relations (IGR). This article will test the governing hypotheses laid out in the Introduction of this Special Issue.
First, it will examine the dominant mode of coordination that shapes intergovernmental relations between Åland and Finland. Here it is expected that, while Åland clearly falls into the 'federalized' box, which might otherwise indicate reliance on the use of multilateral structures, the special federacy relationship Åland has within the unitary Finnish state means that IGR are conducted on a formal bilateral basis that reflects the non-hierarchical partnership between the units. Second, the article will examine the patterns of formal competence allocation over time. In this case, it is assumed that Åland's constitutionally guaranteed status ensures a degree of constitutional protection and 'lock-in' on an asymmetrical basis (i.e. there are no other autonomous units in Finland to allocate competences to).
Third, the article examines the extent to which party-political differences dominate the nature of governmental coordination. Because there is no constitutional hierarchy in the system, it is expected that there is little risk in playing out party incongruence or engaging in partisan conflict, as there is no possibility that Finland can 'retaliate' by suspending self-rule or taking back competences from Åland. In addition, because Åland parties are separate from Finnish parties, this will result in complete incongruence in governing coalitions, so that party 'connections' cannot be used as an informal lubricant of IGR.
Research findings draw on a series of interviews conducted with Åland politicians, government officials and academics in June 2010, as well as primary and secondary literature, party documents and newspaper articles.
Finnish unitarism and Åland's special status
Finland is one of the youngest states in Western Europe. Following six centuries as part of the Swedish Empire, Finland became an autonomous Grand Duchy within the Russian Empire in 1809, and won its independence during the Russian Revolution in 1917. Finland's heritage is reflected in its constitution, which acknowledges the country's two national languages -Finnish and Swedish -though Swedish is only spoken by about 5.5% of the population, mainly in the coastal areas and Åland.
Following in the Nordic tradition of administrative governance, Finland can be categorised as a decentralised unitary state (Loughlin, 2000) . Since achieving independence in 1917, Finland has combined strong central powers in Helsinki with a flourishing system of local government. Since the 1960s, municipalities have been endowed with a wide range of statutory responsibilities for providing welfare services to citizens, including social welfare, health, education, and environmental protection, in addition to tax-raising powers (Sjöblom, 2011: 243) . Like many Nordic states, Finland lacks an elected regional tier of government; responsibilities are vested in municipalities, which cooperate in joint structures at the regional level (Hedegaard and Lindström, 1998: 14) . These regional-level institutions were not created until 1995, at which point Finland's membership of the EU forced it to construct institutions at the regional level to administer and implement EU (Kull, 2009: 25) . As a result, twenty 'Regional Councils' (RCs) were established in 1994, with responsibility for regional development and the implementation of EU policy.
However, the Finnish RCs are relatively weak; instead of being directly elected, they are comprised of municipal councillors. There has been one exceptional 'pilot project' in regional self-government in Kainuu, which was granted a democratically elected Regional Council in 2005 in order to combat slow economic growth (CCRE, 2004) .
However, despite some demands -in particular by Lapland (Suksi, 2011: 144) (Ackren and Lindström, 2012) . What followed was a conflict known as the 'Åland Question', which set the Swedish-oriented Åland irredentist movement against the Finnish authorities. The new League of Nations was called in to decide which country the islands rightfully 'belonged' to, eventually deciding that Åland should remain part of Finland but on a demilitarized and neutral basis, and with a degree of autonomy that protected Åland's Swedish language and culture (Karlsson, 2009: 144) . The League of Nations confirmed the autonomy of the Åland Island in 1921 (largely based on the Act on the Self-Government of the Åland Islands that Finland had preemptively passed in 1920), and the final resolution was guaranteed by international law.
As a result of the Act on Self-Government (or 'Autonomy Act') of 1920, which was revised and extended in 1951 and 1991, Åland was granted a government, legislative assembly, and a Governor who is appointed by the Finnish Government. Its competences have been gradually expanded over the years to include most areas of social policy, agriculture, the environment, policing, economic development and limited fiscal powers. Åland enjoys direct representation in the Nordic Council as well as a seat on the European Committee of the Regions, and it is entitled to send one representative to the Finnish Parliament in Helsinki. However, that is where Åland's integration into Finland ends. Åland was never a part of the modern Finnish state: geographically closer to Stockholm, Åland has maintained its Swedish heritage and Finland has never sought to 'integrate' Åland into its socio-cultural or political structures. Åland enjoys a distinct identity, largely owing to the fact that the island is 95% Swedish-speaking. It has developed a separate party system with no formal links to Finnish parties. Finally, Åland has been granted its own form of regional citizenship, whereby one must live there for 5 years in order to own real estate, gain the right to vote or stand as a parliamentary candidate (Hannum 1990: 373) .
Having provided a brief overview of Åland's special form of autonomy within the decentralised unitary state of Finland, we are now in a position to test the hypotheses set out at the beginning of this article. In addition to its token MP in Helsinki, Åland may submit initiatives on reserved matters to the Finnish Government, which must then present them to the Finnish Parliament for consideration (Daftary, 2000: 17-18) . This is slightly more effective channel of influence in the Parliament than a single Ålandic vote on Finnish affairs, as it involves securing the voice of the Finnish Government.
Intergovernmental relations: Formalized bilateralism
Finally, the most powerful means by which Åland can make its interests known at the Finnish level is through a special opt-out/veto that Åland enjoys in relation to international affairs. According to the Autonomy Act (1991, section 58), the Åland government may propose negotiations on a treaty with a foreign state to the Finnish Government. Furthermore, the Åland government should be informed of any international treaties negotiated by Finland that have an impact on Ålandic matters, and it should have an opportunity to participate in such negotiations (Åkermark, 2009 ). Finally, if Finland signs an international treaty that contains any provisions that directly affect Åland's sphere of competence, Finland must obtain the consent of the Åland regional parliament before that treaty can come into being. instance by engaging in disputes about 'overlapping' policy areas (Åkermark, 2009 ).
For legislative issues, the Governor uses the Åland Delegation to mediate disputes.
The Åland Delegation is a joint organ of Åland and Finland. It was created in the first Autonomy Act in 1920 and its initial task was to calculate the sum of money to be transferred from Finland to Åland; today its responsibilities are much greater and it has developed an important dispute resolution function. (Åkermark, 2009 ).
According to the Autonomy Act, all legislation passed by the Parliament of Åland must be approved by the President of Finland within a period of four months. The President may use veto powers if a law exceeds Åland's legislative competence, or if it affects the security of the country. Therefore, Åland is 'subject to clear though limited supervision by the centre' (Datfary, 2000: 17) , though this right remains very much a formality that is unused. In order to avoid a veto, before any draft legislation is presented to the President, it must be sent to the Åland Delegation, which reports on whether the Lagting has exceeded its authority when adopting legislation. This report is sent to the Supreme Court, which in turn sends its view to the President of Finland. This Delegation has been so far effective in preventing any major disputes from breaking out between Åland and Finland.
From this brief summary of Åland-Finland relations, we can surmise that IGR are handled on a formalized bilateral basis between Åland and Finland, which accords to the special nature of the Åland federacy arrangement. However, 'the very idea of a partnership…which prevails in today's debate in multi-level governance…is not much discussed in either Helsinki or Mariehamn' (Karlsson, 2009: 145) . This is primarily because there are few coordinating mechanisms--let alone opportunities for partnership--between Helsinki and Mariehamn. This is reflected in the paucity of informal relations, such as meetings between the heads of the governments. (Swenden, 2004) . Instead, the Åland autonomy institutions rely on their special constitutional rights to influence Finnish policy-making, such as the right to participate in negotiations of international treaties and to submit initiatives to the Finnish Parliament. However, even these generous rights are not without their problems, as we shall see below.
Competence allocation and a growing 'autonomy leakage'
As Åland is the only substate unit to be granted significant autonomy through a federalized relationship in Finland, competence allocation is conducted on an entirely bilateral and asymmetrical basis (i.e., Åland does not have to worry about vying with other regional units to get more competences from Finland). The Autonomy Act furthermore guarantees that Åland's competences cannot be revoked without twothirds majorities from both Parliaments; so Åland's autonomy is protected through the absence of constitutional hierarchy. This would lead up to expect that Åland's most important concern is to ensure that there is continuity in maintaining the constitutionally protected status of Åland. Let us now test this hypothesis.
The Act on Self-Government for the Åland Islands (or 'Autonomy Act') has been revised twice in order to meet Åland's changing needs, by extending the exclusive competences allocated to Åland. This was the result of lengthy negotiations between the Åland and Finland governments, which then required a two-thirds qualified majority in both parliaments supporting the constitutional amendments.
The original 1920 Act gave the Åland Islands extensive political and cultural autonomy. Åland was granted a provincial government an elected legislative assembly (Lagting) with powers in the fields of education, health, culture, industry and policing. However, the legislative powers granted to the Lagting were allocated in such a way that they were residual to the enumeration of the Finnish Parliament's powers, which included foreign affairs, international treaties and customs and taxation. As Suksi (2011: 140) notes, 'during the first decades of the autonomy arrangement, [there was a] realization that with increasing treaty-making activity, the legislative powers of the national law-maker were increasing at the expense of the Åland Islands's legislative powers'. Åland's competences needed further protection.
The imbalance between the powers of Åland and Finland was partially redressed in a second Autonomy Act of 1951. Unlike the 1920 version, the 1951 Act listed the exclusive competencies of both the Åland and the Finnish parliaments, so the former was not residual to the latter. Furthermore, the 1951 Act extended Åland's competences in new areas, including social welfare, housing, municipalities, public order, the postal service, radio and television, farming, forestry, agriculture, fishing, the environment and mining rights (Palmgren 1997) . Åland was furthermore granted a right of domicile (hembygdsrätt) to protect the local culture and Swedish language. This is a form of regional citizenship which is automatically granted to people born on the Åland Islands, and which foreigners (including Finns) may apply for after living in Åland for at least 5 years (Hannum, 1990: 373; Daftary, 2000: 15) . However, the 1951 Act also became quickly outdated, and Ålanders began preparations for a new Act in the early 1970s, which took twenty years to complete. The 1991 Act had barely entered force when Finland and Åland joined the EU (Suksi, 2011) . When Finland became a candidate country to the EU in 1992, the constitution required Finland to gain Åland's consent; therefore, Åland held a separate referendum on whether or not to join. Despite initial public scepticism, a clear majority of Ålanders voted for accession in 1994 but they also demanded that Finland negotiate to keep Åland's status as a duty-free zone and special citizenship and rules.
As a result, Åland had its own annex to Finland's Treaty of Accession to the EU in 1995, which were established as the 'Åland Protocol' (Baldacchino and Pleijel, 2010) . clear that while Åland's competences were directly affected by EU law it had little power to defend its competences as it was represented by Finland. This has been described as a problem of 'autonomy leakage', whereby there was a leakage of law-making competences to Europe in areas such as agriculture, fisheries and the environment (Suksi, 2011: 141) . Moreover, Åland's MP in Helsinki, Elisabeth Naclaur, argued that Åland was also "leaking competency to Helsinki" (Dowling, 2008) . This is because Åland was leaking competences to the authorities in Finland in areas of EU concern as the EU only communicates with member-states. In Furthermore, the Autonomy Act has a degree of built-in flexibility. Firstly, Åland can (relatively easily), revise and extend its competences through the re-writing of the Autonomy Act. This has ensured the constant 'evolution' of the autonomy provisions to adapt to changing circumstances (Suksi, 2011) . Secondly, there is a degree of flexibility built into competence (re)allocation, as some powers may be transferred from the State to the Åland Government or vice-versa (Lapidoth, 1997) .
For instance, Åland and Finland may (together) agree to transfer a competence that normally lies with the state -such as trade and shipping registers, or banking and credit transfers -to the Åland authorities, or vice versa (Lapidoth 1997: 73; Daftary, 2000: 16) . This is similar to the Legislative Consent ('Sewel') Motion in the UK, whereby the Scottish parliament agrees for a devolved issue to be addressed by the UK Parliament. In Åland, this has occurred recently when the Åland Lagting decided that the Finnish Parliament should have the responsibility of monitoring environmental issues. Therefore, the allocation of competences between Åland and Finland is not only protected by the constitution, is also 'alive' in the sense that it can easily be altered to accommodate changing circumstances. This confirms the hypothesis that Åland has an entrenched autonomy that is not under threat of being constitutionally revoked.
However, this hypothesis fails when tested against Europe. Here, we have identified a problem of autonomy or competence 'leakage', due to the deepening of European integration. As the current Autonomy Act (1991) 
Party Political Disconnections and Incongruence
Political parties in states are often the forces of national integration (Detterbeck and Hepburn, 2010) . They are responsible for aggregating and representing the interests of statewide electorates. Therefore, in the case that more than one party system exists within a state that is completely cut off from the other, this is a recipe for fragmentation. This is the situation in Åland, whose party system developed entirely separately from the Finnish party system. This section explores the third hypothesis put forward at the start of this article -that party incongruence in the Åland and Finnish governments has little effect on intergovernmental relations, thereby enabling Ålandic parties to take adversarial positions without fear of having the Ålandic selfrule revoked, and that the separate party systems means that parties cannot be used as an informal (back)channel of IGR.
The Finnish political system, which emerged in the 1920s, can be described as a fragmented, multi-party system in which no party has ever been able to win a majority of seats in Parliament. As a result, governments tend to be broad coalitions of parties from the left and right (Arter, 2006) . Finnish politics has generally been dominated by three main parties -the Centre Party (a centrist and agrarian party), the Social Democratic Party, and the National Coalition Party (a liberal-conservative party) -which tend to lead coalition governments. Two other parties are also notable. Table 3 ). In addition, two other parties were Table 1 ).
[ INSERT TABLE 1 Tensions have also emerged on EU issues. By far the most controversial issue was the EU's attempts to abolish local legislation on the consumption of 'snus' (mouth tobacco), which was banned by the EU in every member-state except Sweden.
Snus is highly popular in Åland, and is seen as part of its (Swedish) cultural heritage as well as an important economic product (Karlsson, 2009: 145) . Åland wanted to continue selling snus as a tax-free product on its ferries; however this was overruled Importantly, this disagreement occurred at a time when the Centre party was the leading coalition governments in both Åland and Finland (see Table 3 ). under threat, then Åland parties' territorial interests take precedence over ideology.
Conclusion
As an autonomous unit with constitutionally entrenched self-rule but comparatively weak shared-rule at the centre, Åland is very much cut off from politics in Finland. This is a common issue for federacies -the vast majority of which constitute island regions -whereby the multilevel architecture leans heavily towards autonomy and institutional self-rule. Although the centre and the federacy share sovereignty, the weak and indirect shared-rule arrangements diminish the subunit's strength towards the centre -which was clearly evident in Åland in relation to European policies.
Åland's weak voice in national decision-making has put significant strains on Åland-Finland relations, especially in matters of significance to Åland's cultural identity. Åland relies on formal bilateral channels to influence Finnish decisionmaking, however, while constitutionally guaranteed, in practice these channels are often ineffective. This is, firstly, because some of these channels are little used: there are few and irregular meetings between heads of governments and senior ministers. There are, however, other benefits to Åland's federacy relationship with Finland. And that is the ability of Åland political parties to pursue their territorial demands in Finland without fear of reprisal. Åland's parties have adopted a combative approach with the Finnish authorities where the cultural and economic interests of Åland were at stake. This is a much stronger situation than substate units in regionalized states, which may be forced to cooperate with state authorities to avoid fear of repercussions -i.e. by suspending self-rule. It is also clear that the separate political parties operating in Åland mean that they cannot be used as an informal channel of intergovernmental relations, or as a 'whip' by which to ensure compliance with government demands. The independence of Åland political actors means that they are not beholden to national interests, which make for smooth sailing if there are no tensions between the two units. However, in the case that Åland's government is required to contest Finnish decision-making, intergovernmental coordination will continue to be hamstrung by Kafka-like linguistic miscommunication unless the two 'equal partners' find a better way to speak to each other. 
